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HUSTLER MAGAZINE v. FALWELL: A MISLITIGATED
AND MISREASONED CASE
JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON
TRIAL, By Rodney A. Smolla.* New York: St. Martin's Press
1988. Pp. 336. $18.95
BRUCE FEIN**
Professor Rodney A. Smolla deserves acclaim for his workman-
like examination of first amendment tensions in Jerry Falwell v.
Larry Flynt: The First Amendment on Trial. He illuminates the
conflicting social traditions and moral ambivalence that find ex-
pression in the dichotomous lives of Reverend Jerry Falwell and
the unlovable, cretinous Larry Flynt. He deftly traces the origins,
tactics, and evolution of the litigation which eventuated in a hold-
ing that an advertising parody in Hustler Magazine depicting
evangelist Jerry Falwell as a modern-day Elmer Gantry was consti-
tutionally insufficient to justify an emotional distress damage
award.
The reader is rewarded by a meticulous dissection of the pretrial
and trial maneuvering of the lawyers. Vignettes of the protago-
nists, antagonists and supporting cast in the lawsuit are entertain-
ing and exhilarating. Further, the legal, social, and political con-
texts that enveloped the case are illuminated with depth and
animation.
Smolla ultimately pronounces that:
The Supreme Court's opinion in Falwell v. Flynt is a trium-
phant celebration of freedom of speech. Far from signalling the
disintegration of America's moral gyroscope, the opinion reaf-
firms the most powerful magnetic force in our constitutional
compass: that essential optimism of the American spirit, an op-
* James Gould Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law, and Director, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
** Private practitioner and author of a weekly newspaper column for The Washington
Times and co-author with William Bradford Reynolds of a biweekly column for Legal
Times.
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timism unafraid of wild-eyed, pluralistic, free-wheeling debate
(p. 303).
But that exhilarating exegesis of the first amendment does not
sustain the Hustler Magazine v. Falwell" ruling. Hustler Maga-
zine's venomous satire of Falwell should have triggered damages
liability because it was the product of bigotry and emotional hate,
not mental deliberation. In addition, the "fighting words" excep-
tion to the first amendment2 made Falwell's claim constitutionally
irreproachable. These theories of liability, unargued by Falwell's
attorneys, would have left undisturbed "wild-eyed, pluralistic, free-
wheeling debate" (p. 303) correctly cherished by Smolla and first
amendment votaries. One lesson of Hustler Magazine v. Flynt is
that bad lawyering frequently makes bad law.
I. THE FACTS
Reverend Jerry Falwell evoked perfervid animosity in the pub-
lisher of Hustler Magazine, Larry Flynt. Flynt's rebellion and bel-
ligerence against convention and traditional American moral val-
ues was a congenital tropism. Falwell's conservative preachings and
celebrity status outraged Flynt because they fostered what the lat-
ter belittled: adherence to organized religion; marital fidelity; sex-
ual abstinence; rejection of homosexuality; abstemiousness; and
condemnation of the obscene, indecent, and vulgar. Yet, the litiga-
tion between Flynt and Falwell did not arise from a personal ven-
detta. Its source was Flynt's virtually pathological animosity to-
ward persons who believed bacchanalian behavior was less morally
worthy than the puritanical.
The debasing advertisement triggering the Hustler Magazine v.
Flynt lawsuit made no appeal to reason. It sought to villainize
Falwell and religion generally by the exploitation of unthinking
emotion and prejudice.
The advertisement portrayed Falwell as a featured celebrity en-
dorsing the products of Campari Liqueur, including the following
apocryphal interview:
1. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988), rev'g Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
2. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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FALWELL: My first time was in an outhouse outside
Lynchburg, Virginia.
INTERVIEWER: Wasn't it a little cramped?
FALWELL: Not after I kicked the goat out.
INTERVIEWER: I see. You must tell me all about it.
FALWELL: I never really expected to make it with Mom,
but then after she showed all the other guys in town such a
good time, I figured, "What the hell!"
INTERVIEWER: But your mom? Isn't that a bit odd?
FALWELL: I don't think so. Looks don't mean that much
to me in a woman.
INTERVIEWER: Go on.
FALWELL: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses
on Campari, ginger ale and soda-that's called a Fire and
Brimstone-at the time. And Mom looked better than a Bap-
tist whore with a $100 donation.
INTERVIEWER: Campari on the crapper with Mom...
how interesting. Well, how was it?
FALWELL: The Campari was great, but Mom passed out
before I could come.
INTERVIEWER: Did you ever try it again?
FALWELL: Sure ... lots of times. But not in the out-
house. Between Mom and the shit, the flies were too much to
bear.
INTERVIEWER: We meant the Campari.
FALWELL: Oh, yeah. I always get sloshed before I go out
to the pulpit. You don't think I could lay down all that bull-
shit sober, do you? (pp. 1-2).
Inconspicuously typed below the advertisement was the dis-
claimer: "Ad Parody-Not to Be Taken Seriously." It discredited
the advertisement as a contribution to robust debate over religion,
religious creeds, or the pulpit in American life, or criticism of hyp-
ocritical preachers such as Jim Bakker or Jimmy Swaggart. As sub-
stantiated in a Flynt deposition, its purpose was vindictive: to set-
tle an imagined score with Reverend Falwell who animadverted
generally against practices characteristic of Flynt's private life (p.
54). Indeed, Flynt lamented his lawyer's advice regarding inclusion
of the advertising disclaimer (p. 54).
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Flynt fought Falwell's ideology not by stimulating reasoned dis-
course, but by a knowingly false, ad hominem advertisement calcu-
lated to marshal religiously bigoted responses in readers. The in-
flammatory advertisement purported to assert the following:
- that Falwell's initial sexual experience was with his mother
in an outhouse while inebriated;
- that he frequently indulged in sexual intercourse with his
mother;
- that his mother was sexually promiscuous; and
- that he was an alcoholic by necessity to enable him to
preach a religious creed that he disbelieved.
None of these false insinuations contributes to reasoned debate
or reflection over whether Falwell's teachings are meritorious.
They are akin to Adolph Hitler's emotion-laden lies regarding per-
secution of German ethnics to justify aggression against Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, or KKK tirades against
"niggers." The goal of such speakers is to alter public sentiment by
stimulating close-minded responses.
The advertisement's disclaimer added nothing to a reasoned ex-
amination of Falwell's character or religious or political views. Its
purpose was to shield Flynt from a libel suit by renouncing factual
assertions. Flynt probably hoped the vicious caricature of Falwell
would injure his reputation, cause emotional distress, and evoke
verbal or physical retaliation that would boost the circulation of
Hustler Magazine and hurl Flynt into the public limelight.
In sum, the vulgar advertisement of Falwell undercut reasoned
discourse and debate, the foremost building blocks of self-govern-
ment. It sought to evoke an unthinking dislike of Reverend Falwell
to gratify Flynt's perverse sense of joy in ridiculing traditional
moral values. The advertisement was no more worthy of legal pro-
tection than a spite fence constructed to inflict harm for its own
sake.
3. See, e.g., Welch v. Todd, 260 N.C. 52, 133 S.E.2d 171 (1963); Larkin v. Tsavaris, 85 So.
2d 731 (Fla. 1956).
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II. THE LITIGATION
Falwell sued Flynt and Hustler Magazine for invasion of pri-
vacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 The
district court directed a verdict against Falwell on the privacy
claim. The jury returned a verdict for Flynt and Hustler Magazine
on the libel claim. It found that the small-type disclaimer stripped
the Falwell parody of any factual assertions in the mind of a rea-
sonable reader.5 According to the Supreme Court, only false state-
ments of fact can justify damages in defamation suits initiated by
public personages like Falwell. 6 The jury, however, ruled for
Falwell on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. It
awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in puni-
tive damages against both defendants. The court of appeals af-
firmed the damage judgment 7 but the Supreme Court reversed."
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist declared
that the government interest in protecting public figures from
emotional distress inflicted by speech that is patently offensive and
intended to cause such harm cannot trump the first amendment
when the speech as reasonably interpreted contains no factual as-
sertions regarding the public figure involved.9 The first amend-
ment, Rehnquist explained, furthers the common quest for truth
and the vitality of society as a whole by safeguarding the free flow
of opinions and ideas. There is no such thing as a "false" idea, he
insisted. 0 The right to criticize public men and measures is a pre-
rogative of American citizenship. According to Rehnquist, emo-
tional distress damage claims are unavailable to public figures ab-
sent clear and convincing proof of a false statement of fact
published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was accurate." Otherwise, Rehnquist conjec-
4. 108 S. Ct. at 877-78.
5. Id. at 882-83.
6. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 163-64 (1967) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
7. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
8. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
9. Id. at 882-83.
10. Id. at 879 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
11. Id. at 880.
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tured, public debate about public figures would be stifled and first
amendment goals thwarted.
Rehnquist noted that political cartoonists such as Thomas Nast
contributed to political colloquy and reflection through biting
burlesques of "Boss" Tweed.'" Other cartoonists similarly enriched
political discourse with distorted imitations featuring President
Lincoln's tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt's glasses and
teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's jutting jaw and cigarette holder.
These types of cartoons were all calculated to cause emotional up-
set or injury in the caricatured figure.
The Chief Justice conceded that the Falwell ad parody was at
best a "distant cousin" of political cartoons. He insisted, neverthe-
less, that neither an "outrageousness" standard nor any other prin-
cipled rule would permit separating the one from the other without
subverting the mission of the first amendment. 13
Rehnquist acknowledged that "vulgar," "offensive," and "shock-
ing" speech is subject to regulation in some circumstances, and
that suppression of "fighting" words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to invite an immediate breach of
the peace-is compatible with the first amendment. 4 Falwell's
damage award, however, did not rest on these exceptions to free
speech protection.
III. A MISLITIGATED AND MISREASONED CASE
The outcome of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell is unsettling and
unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, the symbol and substance of
the first amendment becomes an object of ridicule rather than rev-
erence when it safeguards expression that laymen intuitively sense
lacks any plausible nexus to cerebral activity, a common search for
truth, or education. Additionally, the refusal of the Supreme Court
to demarcate a first amendment line between the Falwell parody
and political cartoons suggests a decay in society's moral convic-
tions. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized: "The law is
12. Id. at 881.
13. Id. at 881-82.
14. Id. at 882.
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the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the
history of the moral development of the race."15
Further, Falwell should have recovered damages under the
"fighting words" exception to the first amendment.16 Flynt's par-
ody was intended to provoke a breach of the peace or other retalia-
tion by Falwell through falsely blackening his character and that of
his mother. Why Falwell's attorney failed to argue a fighting words
theory of recovery is puzzling.
A.
The influence of the first amendment should extend beyond its
use in adjudicating cases. It should symbolize a preference for a
mentally reflective citizenry and officialdom and a disdain for opin-
ions or decision making dominated by arbitrariness or prejudice.
As Justice Louis Brandeis remarked in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary .... They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.17
Flynt's vulgar parody of Reverend Falwell furthered none of the
first amendment aspirations Brandeis elucidated. It did not foster
the development of individual faculties. Indeed, the advertisement
dulled mental development by stimulating the uncritical or
prejudiced aspects of the mind to tarnish Falwell's credibility and
ideas by falsely depicting the Reverend as a sexually aberrant,
hypocritical alcoholic who enjoyed intercourse with his mother.
15. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
16. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
17. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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According to the jury, the advertisement conveyed no facts that
might have enriched societal debate or individual understanding of
Falwell as both a public figure and religious leader. The caricature
did not assist an iota in fostering intelligent private or public opin-
ion to inform government policy, church-state relations, or moral
standards.
Neither did it aid the discovery or spread of political truth, nor
vindicate the freedom to speak as you think. By its own disclaimer,
the Hustler Magazine advertisement disavowed any effort to dis-
cover or spread any type of truth. Additionally, the parody did not
reflect Flynt's "thinking" about Falwell or religion, but only un-
thinking hatred and bigotry. It was akin to asserting that all blacks
are niggers afflicted with mental retardation and an insatiable lust
to rape white women. Both stem from a resistance to thoughtful-
ness, not its employment.
The advertisement undermined the type of public debate of
Falwell and his creed that advances enlightened self-government.
Instead, it attempted to choke debate by falsely branding Falwell a
moral and religious fraud. Education cannot occur without a wa-
tering of facts or plausible, thoughtful opinions.
The first amendment should symbolize to the citizenry a consti-
tutional preference for reason over bigotry to safeguard a civilized
society. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell mocked this desideratum by
equating a vulgar advertisement communicating neither facts nor
ideas with pointed political cartoons with earmarks of clever think-
ing. Adolph Hitler and his chief propagandist Joseph Goebbels in
Germany stirred nationwide hatred of Jews by repeated appeals to
anti-Semitism and religious stereotyping. Their rhetorical evils did
not promote thinking within the German population, but only ac-
quiescence in the Holocaust and complicity in Khristallnacht.
Flynt's hate-filled parody of Reverend Falwell holds the same dan-
gers of riotous conduct and mindless intolerance as did Hitler's ti-
rades against the Jews.' 8
18. These fears are reinforced by the current neo-Nazi video computer games proliferat-
ing in West Germany. Styled "The Nazi," one computer game presents 21 questions with
one of three possible answers eliciting praise. For instance, to the question: "A Turkish boy
comes at you, what do you do?" One answer is: "I'd bash him in." That answer is denounced
as "too humane to the bastard." Praise is reserved for the answer: "I would give him a
[Vol. 30:905
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Hustler Magazine v. Falwell wrongly teaches the citizenry that
an outpouring of venom against a disliked person is as constitu-
tionally respectable as informed, reflective discourse buttressed by
pertinent facts. As Brandeis recognized in Whitney, a nation domi-
nated by bigots or the close-minded is a nation unfit for democ-
racy. That political axiom was verified in Germany and Italy under
Nazi and Fascist rule. The Supreme Court should have sustained
Falwell's damage recovery by proclaiming that the first amend-
ment is not a suicide pact for the ethos of reason indispensable for
civilized life.19
B.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell contains the earmarks of a deca-
dent society reluctant to draw distinctions between virtue and vice,
between the ennobling and the degrading. The opinion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist lamented an inability to demarcate a principled
first amendment line between the political cartoons of Nast and
debased, repugnant parodies exemplified by the Falwell portrayal.
But as Justice Holmes taught, all law depends on matters of de-
gree "as soon as it is civilized."20 As Holmes explained:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical ex-
treme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of princi-
ples of policy which are other than those on which the particular
right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their
own when a certain point is reached. 1
The Supreme Court could have rationally separated political
cartoons from Larry Flynt's bilious caricature of Falwell if it was
confident that gratification of bigotry was less morally worthy than
mental deliberation. The Hustler Magazine advertisement con-
tained neither facts nor ideas generated by mental activity.
potassium cyanide capsule and tell him it was a sweet." See Nfrnberger Nachrichten, Janu-
ary 5, 1989.
The first amendment should not prevent the United States from prohibiting the importa-
tion or domestic production of such glorification of intolerance and hatred.
19. Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("for while the Constitu-
tion protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.").
20. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milw. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
21. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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Rehnquist erred in assuming that the advertisement conveyed
an idea ascribable to thought. What was the idea? Was it that reli-
gious preachers should be disbelieved or religion disavowed? If so,
why were not Jim Bakker or Jimmy Swaggart featured? The con-
spicuous failure of Rehnquist to describe the idea Flynt putatively
communicated in the advertisement confirms the futility of the
task, like attempting to handcuff an eel.
Supreme Court precedent justified a first amendment line be-
tween Flynt's appeal to religious prejudice and Nast's political sat-
ire. In Young v. American Mini Theaters,22 the Court sustained a
zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of "adult" theaters or
bookstores within 500 feet of a residential area or within 1,000 feet
of particularized business land uses. Writing for a plurality, Justice
John Paul Stevens intuitively recognized a constitutional differ-
ence between genuine thought and gratification of degrading appe-
tites. He remarked:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us
to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can un-
derstand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the
same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to
war to preserve the citizen's right to see "specified Sexual Activ-
ities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.23
In Beauharnais v. Illinois,24 the Court upheld application of a
statute making criminal the defamation of any "'class of citizens,
of any race, color, creed or religion [that exposed the objects] to
contempt, derision, or obloquy, or which [was] productive of
breach of the peace or riots.' "25 The statute was invoked to punish
the public distribution of an emotionally inflammatory leaflet
designed to arouse racial hatred. The leaflet demanded that Chi-
cago officials "'halt the further encroachment, harassment and in-
vasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons
by the Negro,' ",26 called for the unity of one million self-respecting
white Chicagoans, and vituperated that "'[i]f persuasion and the
22. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 70.
24. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
25. Id. at 251.
26. Id. at 252.
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need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the
negro will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies,
knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will.' ",27
Speaking for the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted that
"'[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Con-
stitution.' ,,28 Frankfurter understood that the utterances at issue
sought exploitation of man's emotions and racial prejudice, not de-
velopment of informed opinion. He recounted the teachings of
history:
From the murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy in 1837 to the Cic-
ero riots of 1951, Illinois has been the scene of exacerbated ten-
sion between races, often flaring into violence and destruction.
In many of these outbreaks, utterances of the character here in
question, so the Illinois legislature could conclude, played a sig-
nificant part.29
Frankfurter added that foreign immigration and Negro migration
to Illinois during the war years erupted in race riots and bombings
fomented in part by "false or malicious defamation of racial and
religious groups, made in public places and by means calculated to
have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was
presented. 3 0 The Beauharnais decision thus differentiated be-
tween speech calculated to provoke emotional frenzy and speech
enhancing understanding or contemplation.
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,1 the Court sustained the
discipline of a high school student for delivering a political nomi-
nating speech replete with sexual innuendo and metaphor. Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger maintained:
[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school education
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public dis-
course. Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system" disfavor the use of
27. Id.
28. Id. at 257 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
29. Id. at 259 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 261.
31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to
others.2
The Bethel decision acknowledges the legitimate government in-
terest in fostering appeals to reason rather than unthinking vis-
ceral responses to bolster intellectual habits that underwrite com-
munity decency.
In short, Rehnquist could have drawn a principled line in Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell that denied first amendment protection
to Hustler Magazine's ad, which was calculated to arouse emo-
tional hostility towards Falwell, while protecting political cartoon-
ists who employ contemplative faculties in their trade. Permitting
Falwell protection from Flynt's parody would not place religious
figures or religion beyond harsh reproach or scrutiny. Flynt might
have republished Clarence Darrow's devastating cross-examination
of William Jennings Bryan at the celebrated Scopes trial if he gen-
uinely wished to question or jape at religious dogma. He might
have hired investigative reporters to follow the sexual and financial
misdeeds of Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart if he wished to ex-
pose moral failings in religious figures. A Falwell litigation victory
could have avoided suppression of any speech or criticism of reli-
gious figures or creeds that is the product of thought.
The progress of civilization has been the progress of reason over
close-minded intolerance. In constitutionally equating Larry
Flynt's vices with Thomas Nast's virtues, Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell is an obstacle to that progress. The Constitution was
drafted and ratified by a society that saluted the Age of Reason
and inveighed against the arbitrary, the intolerant, and the intel-
lectually vacuous. That discrimination deserves expression in first
amendment jurisprudence.
C.
The "fighting words" exception to the first amendment endorsed
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell provided an additional legal theory
justifying a Falwell triumph. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,33
the Court upheld punishment for the use of insulting "fighting"
32. Id. at 683.
33. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.34
The Hustler ad parody of Falwell epitomizes fighting words. The
jury found that the false portrayal of Reverend Falwell as a mor-
ally decadent hypocrite who enjoys sex with his mother engen-
dered emotional distress in FalwelL That type of distress would
tend to incite in an average person a desire for physical retaliation
to defend honor. The incitement of Falwell clearly was as great as
that punished in Chaplinsky in which the Court declared the epi-
thets "damned racketeer" and "damned fascists" would provoke
the ordinary individual to reprisal. 5
Why did Falwell's attorney omit a fighting words justification for
a damage recovery? Professor Smolla leaves the issue unexplored.
A fighting words theory carried the attraction of avoiding more pi-
oneering first amendment doctrine withdrawing protection for ex-
pression calculated to appeal to bigoted or irrational instincts.
Virginia law arguably recognizes a tort action for psychological
injuries inflicted by fighting or insulting words. A Virginia criminal
statute punishes false publications or words "which from their
usual construction and common acceptation are construed as in-
sults and tend to violence and breach of the peace."3 A violation
of such criminal laws frequently establishes the foundation for a
private tort remedy entitling the injured party to damages.37
CONCLUSION
Professor Smolla's informative chronicling of the Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell litigation is a delight for those who celebrate rea-
soned discourse. It is provocative, insightful, lucid, but ultimately
unpersuasive in concluding that a defeat for Flynt would have
meant a defeat for the first amendment and the cultivation of in-
tellectual customs that sustain tolerant societies.
34. Id. at 571-72.
35. Id. at 574.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (1988).
37. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 36 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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